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1 Introduction
The evolution of public capital such as infrastructures, roads, telecommu-
nications, energy, and common-pool natural resources plays a key role in
economic analysis. While agents derive utility from the utilization of pub-
lic capital, they also have the ability to invest in technology to increase the
productivity of future stocks of public capital, thereby expanding future pro-
duction and consumption possibilities. Because several agents contribute to
the technological progress for the stock of a public capital, there is an ex-
ternality contained in this investment. Indeed, investment in public good is
an important economic activity with externalities. Fesselmeyer et al. (2012)
consider strategic interactions in capital utilization for public capital with
endogenous technological progress. They consider a deterministic framework
to isolate the eﬀect of games and strategic interactions on consumption, tech-
nological changes, stock of capital in the dynamics and in the steady state.
However, while agents have a certain control over technological progress, the
evolution of public capital is highly uncertain. Indeed, the evolution of public
capital depends on random shocks, which implies that agents make decisions
without knowing the realizations of these shocks, i.e., they face uncertainty
in outcomes. However, agents generally face more than just uncertainty in
outcomes since the true distributions of these shocks are never known exactly.
In other words, agents generally face structural uncertainty because they do
not know the structure of the economy. Unlike uncertainty in outcomes,
structural uncertainty evolves through learning. Indeed, the agents gather
and analyze data in order to learn the distribution of the random shocks. In
that case, agents make consumption and investment decisions as well as learn
simultaneously about the stochastic process. In general, decision-making and
learning are nonseparable and inﬂuence each other.1
It is the purpose of this paper to study endogenous technological progress
in a dynamic game of capital utilization with learning. Our model adds two
1There is a two-way interaction between decision making and learning. On the one
hand, decision making may have an eﬀect on learning, which is referred as experimentation.
On the other hand, the presence of learning adds risk which aﬀects future payoﬀs and thus
behavior.
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important features by allowing agents to strategically invest in technology,
while at the same time learning about the stochastic process governing the
evolution of public capital, including the eﬀect of investment in technology on
future stock. Strategic utilization of public capital has already been studied
without the issue of endogenous technological change and learning, beginning
with the Great Fish War model of Levhari and Mirman (1980) in the deter-
ministic case. Recently, Antoniadou et al. (2012) studies strategic exploita-
tion of a common-pool natural resource under uncertainty in outcomes but
without the inclusion of technological progress or learning. In their model,
the distribution of the random shock is known and the agents have no need
to learn about the structure of the economy.2 The issue of learning has gen-
erally been addressed in dynamic single-agent problems, thereby removing
the issue of strategic interactions and externalities.3 In particular, the eﬀect
of learning on consumption only (without the inclusion of an investment de-
cision) has already been studied in the context of the Mirman-Zilcha model
in Koulovatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009).
In our model, agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also
invest to improve the future stock. Hence, the model has both a dynamic
externality (i.e., consumption of an agent aﬀects the payoﬀ of the other
agent through the evolution of the stock) and an investment externality
(i.e., investment of one agent has a positive eﬀect on the public good and
thus future payoﬀs of the other agent). Moreover, agents face structural
uncertainty because the distributions of the shocks aﬀecting the evolution of
the stock are unknown. However, agents observe past shocks and learn using
Bayesian methods.4 Agents are fully rational and anticipate learning, which
entwines decision-making with learning.5 That is, the learning activity due
2In a diﬀerent context, Mirman and To (2005) has addressed the issue of investing in
capital in an overlapping generation model.
3See Bernhardt and Taub (2011) for a recent paper on learning in oligopoly when the
ﬁrms learn from prices.
4There is no experimentation in our model. For the literature on single-agent exper-
imentation with capital accumulation , see Freixas (1981), Bertocchi and Spagat (1998),
Datta et al. (2002), El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993), Huﬀman and Kiefer (1994), and Beck
and Wieland (2002).
5There is no adaptive learning. Under adaptive learning, agents are bounded because
they assume that beliefs will not change over time, i.e., they do not anticipate learning.
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to structural uncertainty is directly embedded in a dynamic game of public
capital utilization. The agents’ learning activity entwine with the strategic
interaction adds an element of risk to the decision making process.
We ﬁrst derive and characterize the unique recursive learning Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for general distribution of the shocks and the beliefs. In
particular, we do not rely on conjugate families for distribution, i.e., we al-
low for the prior and posterior p.d.f.’s to belong to diﬀerent families. This
generality is important since the use of conjugate priors are restrictive.6 In
addition to providing a detailed guide to the derivation of the equilibrium
under learning when beliefs are anticipated to be updated many times, we
study the eﬀect of learning on behavior, both consumption and investment.
The addition of learning has a profound change on equilibrium values. With-
out learning, the Levhari and Mirman (1980) framework (with or without the
investment externality) displays certainty equivalence, i.e., the random pro-
duction shocks aﬀect the optimization problem through their means. When
distributions of the shocks are unknown and agents learn about them, there
is no certainty equivalence and higher moments of the distribution for beliefs
have an eﬀect on the equilibrium values. In particular, we show that the
anticipation of learning generates more risk about the future, which induces
agents to decrease consumption, increase investment, while overall extraction
is ambiguous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and de-
ﬁnes the recursive learning Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Section 3 derives and
characterize the equilibrium for both ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizons. Section 4
studies the eﬀect of learning on the equilibrium when beliefs are unbiased.
2 Model and Equilibrium Definition
In this section, we embed learning in a dynamic game in which agents make
both consumption and investment decisions and at the same time learn about
See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a detailed exposition of adaptive learning.
6One popular approach is to rely on the fact that the family of normal distributions
with an unknown mean is a conjugate family for samples from a normal distribution.
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the stochastic process governing the evolution of the capital. We ﬁrst present
the model. We then deﬁne the recursive learning Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Model
Consider the Great Fish War dynamic game of Levhari and Mirman (1980)
in which several agents derive utility from the consumption of a common
capital stock. Formally, let yt be capital stock available at the beginning of
period t. If the capital goes unexploited in period t, then the stock evolves
stochastically according to the rule
y˜t+1 = y
η˜β,t
t (1)
where η˜β,t is a random shock in period t, i.e., the shock is realized in period
t + 1.7
In period t, agent j extracts a quantity cj,t from the stock yt, which
yields utility u(cj,t) = ln cj,t, j = 1, 2. In addition to consuming the stock,
agent j extracts additional ij,t units that are immediately invested in order
to increase the future stock. Hence, a total
∑2
j=1 ij,t is invested back, and the
remaining yt−
∑2
j=1 (cj,t + ij,t) is left for future use. The present consumption
and investment of the capital by the two agents have an eﬀect on the future
stock. The evolution of an exploited stock follows the stochastic rule
y˜t+1 =
(∑2
j=1
ij
)η˜α,t (
y −
∑2
j=1
(cj,t + ij,t)
)η˜β,t
(2)
where η˜t = [η˜α,t, η˜β,t] is random iid over time. Let the p.d.f. of η˜t be
φ(ηt|θ∗),ηt ∈ R2+ which depends on θ∗ ∈ Θ ⊂ RN for N ∈ N.
To simplify notation, the t-subscript for indexing time is hereafter re-
moved and the hat sign is used to indicate the value of a variable in the
subsequent period, i.e., y is stock today and
yˆ =
(∑2
j=1
ij
)ηα (
y −
∑2
j=1
(cj + ij)
)ηβ
(3)
7A tilde sign is used to distinguish a random variable from its realization.
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is stock tomorrow. From (3), the shocks ηα and ηβ measure the contributions
of the unexploited stock and the investment goods, respectively, toward the
new capital. Speciﬁcally, from (3), for a given shock ηα, investment improves
the renewability of the stock through the investment component (i1 + i2)
ηα
such that investment goods are perfect substitutes.
Having described the stochastic evolution of the stock, we next explain
the information available to the agents and their learning process. The agents
do not know the value of θ∗ (i.e., they do not know the distribution of η˜),
but they have common prior beliefs about its value expressed as a prior
p.d.f. ξ on Θ. That is, the probability that θ∗ ∈ S is ∫
θ∈S ξ(θ)dθ for any
S ⊂ Θ. Because the shock η is observable, the agents update their beliefs
using Bayesian method. Here, the agents learn about the stochastic process
that governs the evolution of the stock. In particular, the agents learn about
the impact of their investment on the future stock through the distribution
of η˜α. Given a prior ξ and the observation η today, the posterior tomorrow
is
ξˆ(θ|η) = φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)∫
x∈Θ φ(η|x)ξ(x)dx
(4)
for θ ∈ Θ, by Bayes’ Theorem.
To distinguish among diﬀerent horizons of the dynamic game, we use
the index τ = 0, 1, . . . , T . Given the present stock of the capital, agent
j maximizes the expected sum of discounted utilities. The anticipation of
acquiring and using data is embedded directly in the value function. Hence,
for j, k = 1, 2, j = k, the τ -period-horizon value function for agent j is
vτj (y; ξ) = max
cj ,ij
{
ln cj + δ
∫
η∈R2+
vτ−1j
(
(i1 + i2)
ηα
(
y −
∑2
j=1
(cj + ij)
)ηβ
; ξˆ(·|η)
)
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
}
, (5)
where
∫
θ∈Θ φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ is the expected p.d.f. of the shocks. From (5), learn-
ing is anticipated using Bayesian updating. In a dynamic context, rational
expectations imply that the information contained in the future production
7
shock is anticipated. The anticipation of learning is integrated into (5) by an-
ticipating the updated beliefs from ξ to ξˆ(·|η) using (4). As shown by Koulo-
vatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009) in a growth single-agent model with-
out investment, the anticipation of learning is related to the nonseparability
of control and learning since the dynamics given in (2) and (4) are entwined
through the shocks. The anticipation of learning generates more uncertainty
for the agents because future beliefs are treated as random variables from
today’s perspective.
2.2 Equilibrium Definition
We next deﬁne the recursive learning Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a T -
period-horizon game. The equilibrium consists of the strategies of the two
agents for every horizon from the ﬁrst period (when there are T periods left)
to the last period (when there is no horizon). Without loss of generality, we
assume that the two agents split the stock equally and do not invest in the
last period. As in Levhari and Mirman (1980), the assumption of a log utility
function implies that the allocation of the stock in the last period has no eﬀect
on the dynamic game. Condition 1 states the behavior in the last period,
i.e., when the horizon is τ = 0. Condition 2 states the recursive equilibrium
for every horizon of the game. Statement 2a is consistent with statement 1.
Statement 2b reﬂects the recursive nature of the equilibrium in which the
equilibrium continuation value function for a τ -period horizon depends on
the equilibrium strategies for τ ′-period horizons, τ > τ ′ ≥ 0. Learning is
embedded in the dynamic game through the anticipation of updated beliefs.
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Definition 2.1. The tuple {Cτ1 (y; ξ), Iτ1 (y; ξ), Cτ2 (y; ξ), Iτ2 (y; ξ)}Tτ=0 is a re-
cursive learning Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a T -period-horizon game if,
for all y and ξ,
1. For τ = 0, C01 (y; ξ) = C
0
2 (y; ξ) = y/2, I
0
1(y; ξ) = I
0
2 (y; ξ) = 0.
2. For τ = 1, 2, . . . , T , for j, k = 1, 2, j = k, given {Cτk (y; ξ), Iτk (y; ξ)}
and {Ct1(y; ξ), I t1(y; ξ), Ct2(y; ξ), I t2(y; ξ)}τ−1t=0 ,
{Cτj (y; ξ), Iτj (y; ξ)}
= argmax
cj ,ij
{
ln cj
+ δ
∫
η∈R2+
V τ−1j
(
(ij + I
τ
k (y; ξ))
ηα (y − cj − ij − Cτk (y; ξ)− Iτk (y; ξ))ηβ ; ξˆ(·|η)
)
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
}
(6)
where the posterior ξˆ(·|η) is consistent with (4). Moreover, for any y′
and ξ′,
(a) For τ ′ = 0,
V 01 (y
′; ξ′) = V 02 (y
′, ξ′) = ln(y′/2). (7)
(b) For τ ′ = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1,
V τ
′
j (y
′; ξ′) = lnCτ
′
j (y
′; ξ′)+δ
∫
η′∈R2+
V τ
′−1
j
(
Γ(η′); ξˆ′(·|η′)
)⎡⎣ ∫
θ′∈Θ
φ(η′|θ′)ξ′(θ′)dθ′
⎤
⎦ dη′,
(8)
such that ξˆ′(·|η′) is consistent with (4) and
Γ(η′) ≡
(∑2
s=1
Iτ
′−1
s (y
′; ξ′)
)η′α
·
(
y −
∑2
s=1
(
Cτ
′−1
s (y
′; ξ′) + Iτ
′−1
s (y
′; ξ′)
))η′β
. (9)
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3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we fully characterize the equilibrium for ﬁnite and inﬁnite
horizons. We provide a detailed guide to the derivation of the equilibrium
and explain how to deal with the fact that the continuation value function
encompasses beliefs that have been updated many times. We ﬁnally give
several examples to show the generality of our results.
Proposition 3.1 provides the equilibrium for any ﬁnite horizon. The equi-
librium values hold for general distributions, i.e., no assumption is needed on
the production shock as well as on the distribution of prior beliefs beyond the
fact that integrals must exist. The model does away with all the diﬃculties
inherent in Bayesian analysis. In particular, the prior need not belong to
the conjugate family of the distribution of the production shock. In other
words, expression for equilibrium consumption and investment are valid for
a wide range of priors, even those that are outside of families of distributions
that are closed under sampling. Note that the equilibrium values depend
on the mean of the shocks (conditional on the unknown parameter) and the
distribution of beliefs. In other words, the conditional mean shocks
μs(θ˜) ≡
∫
η∈R2+
ηsφ(η|θ˜)dη, (10)
s ∈ {α, β} are random variables becauce θ˜ is unknown and random from the
agents’ point of view.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that for 0 < μα(θ) + μβ(θ) < ∞ for all θ ∈
Θ. There exists a unique recursive Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a T -period
game, T = 1, 2, . . . In equilibrium, for τ = 0, 1, . . . , T , each agent consumes
Cτ (y; ξ) =
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
2− δ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))(1 + δτ (μα(θ) + μβ(θ))τ )
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ) ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠
−1
y,
(11)
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and invests
Iτ (y; ξ) =
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)(1−δτ (μα(θ)+μβ(θ))τ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ(θ)) ξ(θ)dθ
2
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))(1+δτ (μα(θ)+μβ(θ))τ ))
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ)) ξ(θ)dθ
y, (12)
for s ∈ {α, β},
Proof. We ﬁrst derive equilibrium consumption, investment, and value func-
tion in the one-period horizon. We then consider a τ -period horizon and solve
for equilibrium consumption, investment and value functions recursively. We
ﬁnally impose the initial condition given by the equilibrium for the one-period
horizon to characterize the equilibrium for any horizon. To simplify notation
in the proof, let φe(η) ≡ ∫
θ∈Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ.
1. Consider ﬁrst the one-period-horizon game. Using (6) and (7), for
j, k = 1, 2, j = k, given {C1k(y; ξ), I1k(y; ξ)}, agent j’s one-period-horizon
optimal policies satisfy
{C1j (y; ξ), I1j (y; ξ)}
= argmax
cj ,ij
⎧⎨
⎩ln cj + δ
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠ ln(ij + I1k(y; ξ))
+ δ
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠ ln(y − cj − ij − C1k(y; ξ)− I1k(y; ξ)) + δ ln 2
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
(13)
μs(θ) ≡
∫
η∈R+
ηsφ(η|θ)dη, s ∈ {α, β}. The ﬁrst-order conditions corre-
sponding to (13) are
cj :
1
cj
=
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
y − cj − ij − C1(y; ξ)− I1(y; ξ) , (14)
ij :
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
ij + I1(y; ξ)
=
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
y − cj − ij − C1(y; ξ)− I1(y; ξ) , (15)
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evaluated at cj = C
1(y; ξ) and ij = I
1(y; ξ). Rearranging (14) and (15)
yields
C1(y; ξ) =
y − 2I1(y; ξ)
2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
, (16)
and
I1(y; ξ) =
(y − 2C1(y; ξ)) ∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
2
∫
θ∈Θ
(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
. (17)
Solving (16) and (17) for equilibrium one-period-horizon consumption
and investment yields
C1(y; ξ) =
y
2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
, (18)
I1(y; ξ) =
δ(
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ)y
2(2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ)
. (19)
Since the equilibrium is symmetric, plugging (18) and (19) into the
objective function in (13) yields
V 1(y; ξ) =
⎛
⎝1 + ∫
θ∈Θ
(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠ ln y +Ψ1(ξ), (20)
where Ψ1(ξ) depends on beliefs but not on the stock.
2. Having solved for the one-period-horizon, we consider next a τ -period-
horizon where the continuation value function is V τ−1(y; ξ) = κτ−1(ξ) ln y+
Ψτ−1(ξ) where κτ−1(ξ) and Ψτ−1(ξ) are unknown functions of ξ. Given
V τ−1(y; ξ) = κτ−1(ξ) ln y + Ψτ−1(ξ) and {Cτ (y; ξ), Iτ(y; ξ)}, agent j’s
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τ -period-horizon optimal policies satisfy
{C1(y; ξ), I1(y; ξ)}
= argmax
cj ,ij
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩ln cj + δ
⎛
⎜⎝ ∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))ηαφe(η)dη
⎞
⎟⎠ ln(ij + Iτ (y; ξ))
+ δ
⎛
⎜⎝ ∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))ηβφe(η)dη
⎞
⎟⎠ ln(y − cj − ij − Cτ (y; ξ)− Iτ (y; ξ))
+ δ
∫
η∈R2+
Ψτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))φe(η)dη
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ . (21)
The ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to (21) are
cj :
1
cj
=
δ
∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))ηβφe(η)dη
y − cj − ij − Cτ (y; ξ)− Iτ (y; ξ) , (22)
ij :
δ
∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))ηαφe(η)dη
ij + Iτ (y; ξ)
=
δ
∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))ηβφe(η)dη
y − cj − ij − Cτ (y; ξ)− Iτ (y; ξ)
(23)
evaluated at cj = C
τ (y; ξ) and ij = I
τ (y; ξ). From (22) and (23),
Cτ (y; ξ) and Iτ (y; ξ) are linear in y. Solving (22) and (23) yields
Cτ (y; ξ) =
y
2 + δ
∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))(ηα + ηβ)φe(η)dη
, (24)
Iτ (y; ξ) =
δ
( ∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))ηαφe(η)dη
)
y
2
(
2 + δ
∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))(ηα + ηβ)φe(η)dη
) . (25)
13
Plugging (24) and (25) into the objective function in (21) yields
V τ (y; ξ) =
⎛
⎜⎝1 + δ ∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))(ηα + ηβ)φe(η)dη
⎞
⎟⎠ ln y
+ δ
∫
η∈R2+
Ψτ−1j (ξˆ(·|η))φe(η)dη + Γ(ξ), (26)
≡ κτ (ξ) ln y +Ψτ (ξ), (27)
where Γ(ξ) is a cumbersome function of ξ that has no eﬀect on the
equilibrium and is not characterized here. Hence,
κτ (ξ) = 1 + δ
∫
η∈R2+
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|η))(ηα + ηβ)φe(η)dη (28)
with, from (20), initial condition
κ1(ξ) = 1 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ, (29)
= 1 + δ
∫
η∈R2+
(ηα + ηβ)φ
e(η)dη. (30)
where recall that μs(θ) ≡
∫
η∈R+
ηsφ(η|θ)dη, s ∈ {α, β}. From (28)
and (30), it follows that
κτ (ξ) =
∫
θ∈Θ
τ∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))
tξ(θ)dθ. (31)
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Plugging (4) and (31) into (24) yields
Cτ (y; ξ)
=
(
2 + δ
∫
η∈R2+
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))
t φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)∫
x∈Θ φ(η|x)ξ(x)dx
dθ
⎞
⎠
· (ηα + ηβ)
(∫
x∈Θ
φ(η|x)ξ(x)dx
)
dη
)−1
y, (32)
=
y
2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))t
∫
η∈R2+
(ηα + ηβ)φ(η|θ)dηξ(θ)dθ
,
(33)
=
y
2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))t(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
, (34)
=
y∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))(1+δτ (μα(θ)+μβ (θ))τ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ(θ)) ξ(θ)dθ
, (35)
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as in (11). Similarly, plugging (4) and (31) into (25) yields
Iτ (y; ξ) (36)
=
δ
⎛
⎝ ∫
η∈R2+
⎛
⎝ ∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ)+μβ(θ))
tφ(η|θ)ξ(θ)
∫
x∈Θ φ(η|x)ξ(x)dx
dθ
⎞
⎠ ηα ∫x∈Θ φ(η|x)ξ(x)dxdη
⎞
⎠ y
2
⎛
⎝2 + δ ∫
η∈R2+
⎛
⎝ ∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))tφ(η|θ)ξ(θ)
∫
x∈Θ φ(η|x)ξ(x)dx
dθ
⎞
⎠ (ηα + ηβ) ∫x∈Θ φ(η|x)ξ(x)dxdη
⎞
⎠
,
(37)
=
δ
( ∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))
t
∫
η∈R2+
φ(η|θ)ηαdηξ(θ)dθ
)
y
2
(
2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))t
∫
η∈R2+
(ηα + ηβ)φ(η|θ)dηξ(θ)dθ
) ,
(38)
=
δ
( ∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))
tμα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
y
2
(
2 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
τ−1∑
t=0
δt(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))t(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
) , (39)
=
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1−δτ (μα(θ)+μβ (θ))τ
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ)) ξ(θ)dθ
2
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))(1+δτ (μα(θ)+μβ(θ))τ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ)) ξ(θ)dθ
y, (40)
as in (12).
Proposition 3.2 provides the equilibrium for an inﬁnite horizon, i.e., the
limits of the equilibrium outcomes in Proposition 3.1. As in the ﬁnite-
horizon games, the random production shock enters the optimization problem
through its mean. In other words, the model displays conditional certainty
equivalence, i.e., only the mean of the shocks conditional on the parame-
ter θ aﬀects consumption and investment. However, the whole distribution
deﬁning prior beliefs have an eﬀect on behavior.
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Proposition 3.2. Suppose that 0 < μα(θ) + μβ(θ) < 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Then,
from (11) and (12), limT→∞CT (y; ξ) ≡ C∞(y; ξ) and limT→∞ IT (y; ξ) ≡
I∞(y; ξ) exists. In the infinite horizon, each agent consumes
C∞(y; ξ) =
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
2− δ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ) ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠
−1
y, (41)
and invests
I∞(y; ξ) =
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))ξ(θ)dθ
2
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))ξ(θ)dθ
y. (42)
Proof. Taking limits of (11) and (12) yields (41) and (42).
We present three examples that show the wide applicability of our model,
not only in terms of distributions, but also in terms of general unknown
structures. For instance, normal distributions are not needed to get analytic
results. In Example 3.3, the case of learning about the contribution of invest-
ment but learns about several parameters of the distribution. Example 3.4
deals with a uniform distribution for η˜ with unknown support. Example 3.5
illustrates the case in which the learning planner does not know to which
family η˜ belongs, as well as not knowing the parameters characterizing each
family.
Example 3.3. Let η˜α have a beta distribution with unknown parameters
θ = (θ1, θ2), and beliefs ξ(θ1, θ2), θ1, θ2 > 0. Then, μα(θ) = θ1/(θ1 + θ2). Let
μβ(θ) = μβ be independent of θ and thus known. Hence,
C∞(y; ξ) =
(∫
R2++
2− δ(θ1/(θ1 + θ2) + μβ)
1− δ(θ1/(θ1 + θ2) + μβ)ξ(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2
)−1
y, (43)
I∞(y; ξ) =
δ
∫
R2++
θ1/(θ1+θ2)
1−δ(θ1/(θ1+θ2)+μβ)ξ(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2
2
∫
R2++
2−δ(θ1/(θ1+θ2)+μβ)
1−δ(θ1/(θ1+θ2)+μβ)ξ(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2
y. (44)
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Example 3.4. Let η˜ have a uniform distribution with unknown support [0, θα]
and [0, θβ ], and beliefs ξ(θα, θβ), θα, θβ ∈ (0, 1). Then, μα(θα) = θα/2 and
μβ(θβ) = θβ/2. Hence,
C∞(y; ξ) =
(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
4− δ(θα + θβ)
2− δ(θα + θβ)ξ(θα, θβ)dθαdθβ
)−1
y, (45)
I∞(y; ξ) =
δ
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
θα/2
1−δ(θα/2+θβ)ξ(θα, θβ)dθαdθβ
2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
4−δ(θα+θβ)
2−δ(θα+θβ)ξ(θα, θβ)dθαdθβ
y. (46)
Example 3.5. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2} where θ1 and θ2 refer to two distinct families
of distributions. If 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the prior probability that the production shock
has distribution θ1, then
C∞(y; ξ) =
⎛
⎝ρ ∫
θ1∈Θ
2− δ(μα(θ1) + μβ(θ1))
1− δ(μα(θ1) + μβ(θ1) ξ(θ1)dθ1
+(1− ρ)
∫
θ2∈Θ
2− δ(μα(θ2) + μβ(θ2))
1− δ(μα(θ2) + μβ(θ2) ξ(θ2)dθ2
⎞
⎠
−1
y, (47)
I∞(y; ξ) =
δ
2
⎛
⎜⎝ρ
∫
θ1∈Θ
μα(θ1)
1−δ(μα(θ1)+μβ(θ1))ξ(θ1)dθ1∫
θ1∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ1)+μβ(θ1))
1−δ(μα(θ1)+μβ(θ1))ξ(θ1)dθ1
+ (1− ρ)
∫
θ1∈Θ
μα(θ2)
1−δ(μα(θ2)+μβ (θ2))ξ(θ2)dθ2∫
θ1∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ2)+μβ (θ2))
1−δ(μα(θ2)+μβ (θ2))ξ(θ2)dθ2
⎞
⎟⎠ y.
(48)
4 Analysis
Having characterized the equilibrium for general distributions of the random
variables and provided some examples, we study the eﬀect of learning on the
equilibrium. To that end, we compare equilibrium outcomes under learning
as deﬁned by (41) and (42) with their counterparts under full information,
i.e., θ∗ is known by both agents.
Before proceeding with the comparison, we state the equilibrium out-
comes under full information. Since our model encompasses the case of in-
formed agents with degenerate beliefs, Proposition 4.1 presents the special
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case in which the agents knows the distribution of η˜. When there is no
learning, the equilibrium solution displays certainty equivalence, and there is
no substantial eﬀect of uncertainty on behavior, i.e., higher moments of the
random shocks do not inﬂuence the equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. Let the beliefs be degenerate at θ∗. Then,
C∞(y; θ∗) =
1− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ(θ∗)
2− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ(θ∗))y, (49)
I∞(y; θ∗) =
δμα(θ
∗)
2(2− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ(θ∗)))y. (50)
Proof. Evaluating (41) and (42) at the true distribution (i.e., θ∗ is known)
yields (49) and (50).
Proposition 4.2 states that learning with unbiased beliefs about the shocks
induces both agents to consume less. As in the single-agent case studied
in Koulovatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009), the risk emanating from
learning increases the marginal cost of extraction, which leads to less con-
sumption.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that beliefs about the sum of the mean shocks is
unbiased, i.e., μα(θ
∗) + μβ(θ∗) =
∫
θ∈Θ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ. Then, learning
(with nondegenerate beliefs) decreases consumption, i.e.,
C∞(y; ξ) < C∞(y; θ∗). (51)
Proof. Applying Jensen’s inequality on (41) and (49) yields (51).
We next turn to the eﬀect of learning on investment. To understand how
learning inﬂuences behavior, we compare the ﬁrst-order conditions under
learning and full information. Under learning, the value function for any
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agent evaluated at the equilibrium continuation value function is8
V (y, ξ) = max
cj ,ij
ln cj + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ ln(i1 + i2)
+ δ
∫
θ∈Θ
μβ(θ)
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ ln(y − c1 − i1 − c2 − i2).
(52)
In equilibrium, I∞(y; ξ) equates the marginal beneﬁt of investing with the
marginal cost of extraction, i.e.,
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
2I∞(y; ξ)
=
∫
θ∈Θ
μβ(θ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ (θ))ξ(θ)dθ
y − 2C∞(y; ξ)− 2I∞(y; ξ) . (53)
Under full information, the value function for any agent evaluated at the
equilibrium continuation value function is9
V (y, ξ) = max
cj ,ij
ln cj + δ
μα(θ
∗)
1− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ(θ∗))ξ(θ)dθ ln(i1 + i2)
+ δ
μβ(θ
∗)
1− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ(θ∗)) ln(y − c1 − i1 − c2 − i2). (54)
In equilibrium, I∞(y; θ∗) equates the marginal beneﬁt of investing with the
marginal cost of extraction, i.e.,
μα(θ∗)
1−δ(μα(θ∗)+μβ(θ∗))
2I∞(y; θ∗)
=
μβ(θ
∗)
1−δ(μα(θ∗)+μβ(θ∗))
y − 2C∞(y; θ∗)− 2I∞(y; θ∗) . (55)
To clarify the discussion, we consider two special cases of structural un-
certainty. In the ﬁrst case, the agents do not know the stochastic process
governing the contribution of the investment goods toward new capital, i.e.,
from (3), the agents know the distribution of η˜β and learn about the distribu-
tion of η˜α. In the second case, the agents do not know the stochastic process
governing the contribution of the unexploited stock toward new capital.
Suppose ﬁrst that μβ is independent of θ and thus known. Suppose fur-
8Plugging (31) into (21) (ignoring the constant) and taking limits yields (52).
9Evaluating (52) at the true distribution (i.e., θ∗ is known) yields (54).
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ther that beliefs about the distribution of η˜α are unbiased, i.e., μα(θ
∗) =∫
θ∈Θ μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. From (53) and (55), the eﬀect of learning is three-fold.
First, learning increases the marginal beneﬁt of investing, i.e., by Jensen’s
inequality,
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ)ξ(θ)dθ >
μα(θ
∗)
1− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ) . (56)
Second, learning increases the marginal cost of investing directly, i.e.,
∫
θ∈Θ
μβ
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ)ξ(θ)dθ >
μβ
1− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ) , (57)
by Jensen’s inequality. Learning also increases the marginal cost of extraction
indirectly through lower consumption, i.e., from Proposition 4.2, C∞(y; ξ) <
C∞(y; θ∗). While there are partial eﬀects that pull in opposite directions,
Proposition 4.3 states that the overall eﬀect of learning increases investment.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that μβ is independent of θ and that μα(θ
∗) =∫
θ∈Θ μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. Then, learning increases investment, i.e.,
I∞(y; ξ) > I∞(y; θ∗). (58)
Proof. The proof applies Jensen’s and Holde¨r’s inequalities. Speciﬁcally,
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from (42) and (50),
I∞(y; θ∗) =
δ
2
μα(θ
∗)
2− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ)y (59)
=
δ
2
∫
θ∈Θ μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
2− δ (∫
θ∈Θ μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ + μβ
)y, (60)
<
δ
2
(∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
2− δ(μα(θ) + μβ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
y, (61)
=
δ
2
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠ y, (62)
<
δ
2
(∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ)ξ(θ)dθ
)⎛⎜⎝∫
θ∈Θ
1
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎟⎠ y,
(63)
<
δ
2
⎛
⎝
∫
θ∈Θ
μα(θ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)ξ(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠ y = I∞(y; ξ) (64)
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that
μα(θ)
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ ) is convex in μα(θ), the second inequality comes from Holde¨r’s
inequality, and the third inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality and the
fact that
(
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ)
)−1
is concave in μα(θ).
Suppose next that μα is independent of θ and thus known and that
μβ(θ
∗) =
∫
θ∈Θ μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. As in the ﬁrst case, learning induces more in-
vestment.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that μα is independent of θ and that μβ(θ
∗) =∫
θ∈Θ μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. Then, learning increases investment, i.e.,
I∞(y; ξ) > I∞(y; θ∗). (65)
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 4.3. That
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is, from (42) and (50),
I∞(y; θ∗) =
δ
2
μα
2− δ(μα + μβ(θ∗))y (66)
=
δ
2
∫
θ∈Θ μαξ(θ)dθ
2− δ (μα + ∫θ∈Θ μβ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ)y, (67)
<
δ
2
(∫
θ∈Θ
μα
2− δ (μα + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
)
y, (68)
=
δ
2
⎛
⎜⎝∫
θ∈Θ
μα
1−δ(μα+μβ(θ))
2−δ(μα+μβ(θ))
1−δ(μα+μβ(θ))
ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎟⎠ y, (69)
=
δ
2
(∫
θ∈Θ
μα
1− δ(μα + μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
)⎛⎜⎝∫
θ∈Θ
1
2−δ(μα+μβ(θ))
1−δ(μα+μβ(θ))
ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎟⎠ y,
(70)
<
δ
2
⎛
⎜⎝
∫
θ∈Θ
μα
1−δ(μα+μβ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα+μβ(θ))
1−δ(μα+μβ(θ)) ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎟⎠ y = I∞(y; ξ). (71)
While learning with unbiased beliefs unambiguously decreases consump-
tion and increases investment, the eﬀect on total extraction is ambiguous. To
see how the ambiguity arises, consider the case in which μβ is independent
of θ and thus known. From (41) and (42), total extraction under learning is
2 (C∞(y; ξ∗) + I∞(y; ξ∗)) =
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+2μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ ) ξ(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )ξ(θ)dθ
y, (72)
while, from (49) and (50), total extraction under full information is
2 (C∞(y; θ∗) + I∞(y; θ∗)) =
2− δ(μα(θ∗) + 2μβ(θ∗))
2− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ(θ∗)) y. (73)
Suppose now that μβ(θ) is independent of θ and that μα(θ
∗) =
∫
θ∈Θ μα(θ)ξ(θ)dθ.
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Then, observe ﬁrst that, by Jensen’s inequality,
2 (C∞(y; θ∗) + I∞(y; θ∗)) =
2− δ(μα(θ∗) + 2μβ)
2− δ(μα(θ∗) + μβ) y,
=
∫
θ∈Θ (2− δ(μα(θ) + 2μβ)) ξ(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Θ (2− δ(μα(θ) + μβ)) ξ(θ)dθ
y,
>
∫
θ∈Θ
2− δ(μα(θ) + 2μβ)
2− δ(μα(θ) + μβ) ξ(θ)dθy,
=
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+2μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
ξ(θ)dθy,
(74)
since
2−δ(μα(θ)+2μβ )
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ ) is concave in μα(θ). Next, observe that, by Holder’s in-
equality,
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+2μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
ξ(θ)dθy <
(∫
θ∈Θ
2− δ(μα(θ) + 2μβ)
1− δ(μα(θ) + μβ) ξ(θ)dθ
)
·
⎛
⎝∫
θ∈Θ
1
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
ξ(θ)dθ
⎞
⎠ y,
<
∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+2μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ ) ξ(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Θ
2−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )
1−δ(μα(θ)+μβ )ξ(θ)dθ
y
= 2 (C∞(y; ξ∗) + I∞(y; ξ∗)) .
(75)
Statements in expressions (74) and (75) cannot be reconciled, which illus-
trates the ambiguity of the eﬀect of learning on total extraction.
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